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INTRODUCTION
The facts begin like a common torts exam question: individual A,
finishing his daily workout, walks into a gym bathroom designed,
operated, and maintained by corporation B. Individual A attempts to
use the urinal. It is surrounded by loose floor tiles, which have been,
unbeknownst to A, recently washed and are therefore slippery. As A
approaches the urinal, he slips on the loose tiles and falls onto the
floor, injuring his back. Shaken, A retreats to the showers and turns
on the hot water. But due to B's faulty electrical wiring in the
bathroom, A is severely electrocuted as soon as the hot water touches
his skin and suffers extreme burns. Once at the doctor, A also
discovers that he has been inhaling harmful amounts of dust and toxic
particulates into his lungs because of corporation B's careless waste
disposal near the gym. After reading these facts, you might wonder
whether corporation B employs a good defense lawyer.'
But add a few more details to this scenario.2 For one, A's injuries
occur on a U.S. military base in Iraq during the recent Iraq War.
1. The hypothetical facts are inspired by three cases involving latrine maintenance,
electrical wiring services, and waste disposal during the Iraq War. See generally In re KBR,
Inc., Burn Pit Litig. (KBR II), RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013)
(dealing with injuries arising from waste disposal facilities); Harris v. Kellogg, Brown &
Root Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546-47 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (dealing with injuries
arising from electrical wiring maintenance); Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dealing with injuries arising from latrine
services).
2. These additional facts describe the context of the Aiello, Harris, and In re KBR,
Inc., cases, among others. See KBR II, 2013 WL 709826, at *2; Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at
549; Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 700-01.
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Also, corporation B is a U.S. contractor in Iraq that provides basic
support services, including latrine, electrical, and waste management,
to thousands of soldiers and contractors alike across the country. And
B's services are executed under military contract and supervision.
Before hiring a good personal injury lawyer, B could instead argue
that any tortious claims against it are preempted under the combatant
activities exception' found in the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"),4 barring the claim because it arises out of "the combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war."' Indeed, some courts will agree with B.6
The potentially favorable outcome for corporation B stems from
the D.C. Circuit's 2009 decision in Saleh v. Titan Corp.,' which
"dramatically extended"' the scope of the FTCA's combatant
activities exception. In 2011, under accusations similar to those found
in Saleh, a Fourth Circuit panel in Al Shimari v. CACI International,
Inc.' followed the D.C. Circuit's reasoning, holding that the
combatant activities exception to the FTCA preempted tort claims
arising out of the alleged torturing of Iraqi citizens by private military
contractors ("PMCs") 0 serving as interrogators for the U.S.
military." At bottom, both courts reasoned that the FTCA's
combatant activities exception preempted a plaintiff's claims against a
contractor during wartime if "a private service contractor [was]
integrated into combatant activities over which the military retain[ed]
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006) (stating that no tort claims may proceed against the
United States government "arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war").
4. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
6. See infra Part II.B. (discussing Aiello, Harris, In re KBR, Inc., and other cases that
have recently applied the combatant activities exception).
7. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
8. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., Civil No. 2:09cv341, 2010 WL
1707530, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010), affd in part, vacated in
part, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011).
9. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
10. This Comment refers to all military contractors as PMCs. For a more specific
breakdown of the various kinds of PMCs, see Huma T. Yasin, Playing Catch-up:
Proposing the Creation of Status-Based Regulations to Bring Private Military Contractor
Firms Within the Purview of International and Domestic Law, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
411, 445-64 (2011) (grouping PMCs into six different categories: military provider firms,
military security or defense firms, military intelligence firms, military consultant firms,
military logistic firms, and military support firms).
11. Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420.
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command authority."1 2 To be sure, courts had previously used some
of the exceptions found in the FTCA to bar individuals' claims
against PMCs.1o But courts had only rewarded to PMCs the FTCA's
combatant activities exception in the realm of products liability;14
Saleh and Al Shimari changed that record. In their aftermath, both
cases leave many open questions for future PMC cases with different
facts, including our aforementioned hypothetical."
Of immediate concern is the dearth of guidance that both cases
supply for a vast swathe of PMCs who have assisted the military
during America's recent wars-namely, PMCs providing basic
support services, which include functions such as dining and laundry
services, transportation, and general military base maintenance."
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Fourth Circuit clarifies if these kinds
of basic support services embody "combatant activities." Nor do the
courts address what kind of relationship would need to exist between
military commanders and basic support PMCs that would indicate a
sufficient level of military "command authority" over the PMCs.1 1
12. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added); see also Al-Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420 ("We
hold that . . . where a civilian contractor is integrated into wartime combatant activities
over which the military broadly retains command authority, tort claims arising out of the
contractors' engagement activities are preempted." (citation omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-13 (1988) (preempting
state tort law claim against PMC due to the "discretionary function" exemption to the
FTCA, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); see also infra Part I.B.1 (outlining how the
"discretionary function" and "combatant activities" exceptions have been applied to
contractors before Saleh and Al Shimari).
14. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
negligence and design defect claims brought against the United States and an airline
manufacturer were preempted due to the combatant activities exception); Flanigan ex. rel.
Flanigan v. Westwing Techs., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding
that plaintiff's decedent was barred from asserting tort claims against designer and
manufacturer of military helicopter and helmet under combatant activities exception);
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that
plaintiffs' decedents' product liability claims against missile manufacturer were preempted
by FTCA's discretionary function and combatant activities exceptions).
15. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
16. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 15 (2011)
(noting that, as of March 2011, sixty-one percent of all Defense Department contractors
offered "base support" services such as "maintaining the grounds, running dining facilities,
and performing laundry services").
17. See infra Part II.D.2.
18. See infra Part II.D.3.
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A series of recent cases involving the U.S. military's largest
contractor in Afghanistan and Iraq," Kellogg, Brown & Root
Services, Inc. ("KBR"), 20 has already brought these ambiguities to the
fore. Issues have included (1) whether basic support services should
ever be considered as supporting "combatant activities";"1 (2)
whether attacks on a military base should weigh in favor of viewing
PMCs as supporting "combatant activities"; 22 (3) whether "command
authority" exists when PMCs operate under an open-ended services
contract 23 or with military personnel oversight; 24 and (4) whether
19. See Brief of Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants and Reversal at 1, Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011)
(No. 09-1335).
20. KBR is the wholly owned subsidiary of its parent corporation, KBR, Inc. See
Amended Complaint at 5, KBR, Inc. v. KBR Equity Partners, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:11-
cv-21257 (S.D. Fla. dismissed Nov. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 4592964, 18. Prior to 2007, KBR
itself was a subsidiary of Halliburton, see Yasin, supra note 10, at 461, and has frequently
been known in the past by its full name of "Kellogg, Brown & Root," which is why earlier
cases name the defendant in this way. To avoid confusion, this Comment will use "KBR"
when discussing past, present, and future cases involving the contractor.
21. Compare Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 713-
14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (categorizing latrine services as supporting combatant activities), with
Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 400, 434 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(finding electrical wiring maintenance outside the scope of the combatant activities
exception), appeal dismissed, 618 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2010).
22. Compare Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (supporting its finding that PMC was part
of combatant activities in part because of military base's location in war zone and three
mortar and rocket attacks on the base at time of plaintiff's injury), and Taylor v. Kellogg
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., Civil No. 2:09cv341, 2010 WL 1707530, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr.
16, 2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010) (noting that monthly mortar fire on military base
supports a PMC's claims of conducting maintenance activities in connection with
hostilities), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011), with Bixby v. KBR,
Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2010) (finding that, although an Iraqi water plant
was "[u]ndoubtedly a dangerous place to work," PMC's services at the plant were still not
considered supporting combatant activities since its services were used to support the
restoration of Iraq's oil-production capacity, not actual hostilities).
23. KBR itself provided services under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
("LOGCAP"), which costs the military billions of dollars. See Sharon Weinberger, Ctr. for
Pub. Integrity, Windfalls of War: KBR, the Government's Concierge, IWATCH NEWS (Aug.
30, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/08130/5990/windfalls-war-kbr-
governments-concierge (noting that KBR's work with the U.S. Army under the LOGCAP
has totaled over thirty-seven billion dollars spent in the past decade).
24. This kind of oversight is led by a group of military base personnel called the
"Mayor's Cell." Compare Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 714-15 (indicating that PMCs were
integrated into military's command authority by way of their relationship with the
"Mayor's Cell" who oversaw the military base), with In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig. (KBR
1), 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 978 (D. Md. 2010) (finding that PMC's purported breach of the
LOGCAP contract makes it "unlikely that Defendants were so integrated into the military
chain of command" at the military base), modified, RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D.
Md. Feb. 27, 2013).
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military "command authority" dissolves if a PMC acts negligently on
the battlefield.'
With PMCs cast more prominently in present-day American
combat and operational roles, 26 and given the need to curtail many
tort claims that would otherwise interfere with the important goals of
the United States during wartime," Saleh and Al Shimari may have
justifiably expanded the types of PMC actions covered by the
combatant activities exception beyond the products liability context.2 8
But amplifying this exception raises concerns about how broadly
preemption will affect a host of otherwise viable tort claims,
particularly claims involving injuries to American military
personnel.29
This Comment argues that courts should analyze a PMC's basic
support services during wartime with a particularized, contextual
approach in defining what comprises supporting "combatant
activities" under the FTCA that is "both necessary to and in direct
connection with actual hostilities.""o This approach flows from Saleh's
and Al Shimari's reasoning, particularly Saleh's limiting language"
and the competing interests of expanding or narrowing the scope of
the combatant activities exception.32 In PMC-related tort claims
during wartime, this approach implores courts to focus on two
dimensions, either of which could allow a PMC to qualify for the
25. Compare Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1283-
84 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the military exercised "complete control" over military
convoys by way of the military orders and regulations imposed on PMCs driving the
vehicles), with Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL
3940556, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (observing that military decision-making is not
implicated where the PMC itself provided a convoy service).
26. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
27. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419-20 (4th Cir. 2011) ("The
uniquely federal interest in conducting and controlling the conduct of war .. . is simply
incompatible with state tort liability in that context."), vacated on reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d
205 (4th Cir. 2012); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Allowance of
suits [against contractors] will surely hamper military flexibility and cost-effectiveness, as
contractors may prove reluctant to expose their employees to litigation-prone combat
situations.").
28. For the earlier cases invoking the combatant activities exception only in the
products liability context, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. This is not to say, of course, that other lives lost on the battlefield are less
important, but that injuries to those fighting on the same side of a war effort may give
Americans greater pause. See Getz v. Boeing Co., No. C 07-06396 CW, 2009 WL 636039,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009) (criticizing the expansion of the combatant activities
exception to injuries suffered by American servicemen and women).
30. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770(9th Cir. 1948).
31. See infra Part III.A.1.
32. See infra Part III.A.2.
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combatant activities exception: (1) by analyzing how the PMC service
itself was used during the time of the claim and its connection to
combatant activities; and (2) by analyzing where the specific setting of
a particular claim arose on the battlefield and its connection to
combatant activities.
It is not enough under this approach to simply resolve that a
PMC service originated at a large military base, for instance, to fall
under the combatant activities exception. This approach does not
take the dangers at military bases lightly. So the contractor-
defendant, if unsuccessful under both this approach's "setting" and
"service" prongs, has the heavy burden of demonstrating either (1)
that attacks on a base occurred at the very location involved in the
claim with some frequency or intensity, or (2) that the base itself was
so directly connected to hostilities that it would be unreasonable not
to apply the combatant activities exception.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I gives an overview of
the FTCA and how it has applied to PMCs over the years, most
recently with Saleh and Al Shimari. Part II discusses current cases
involving KBR that have applied the combatant activities exception
in conflicting ways. Part II then assesses where the KBR cases leave
the various components of the Saleh and Al Shimari holdings. Part III
suggests a way forward in analyzing these and future basic support
PMC cases, and ultimately recommends a particularized, contextual
approach that re-examines Saleh's and Al Shimari's holdings. Part IV
applies these new understandings of the combatant activities
exception to the recent KBR cases discussed in Part II and evaluates
whether the courts correctly decided outcomes of recent and ongoing
litigation. Under this Comment's approach, Part IV finds that in three
KBR cases since Saleh-involving the latrine, electrical, and waste
services mentioned in the above hypothetical"--courts wrongly
invoked the combatant activities exception. The remaining cases
properly extended or excluded the combatant activities exception to
KBR under the particularized, contextual approach.
33. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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I. APPLYING THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT TO PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS 34
A. The FTCA Preempts Claims Against PMCs, but Does Not
Provide for Immunity
Enacted in 1948,35 the FTCA waives the United States's
sovereign immunity in certain tort claims." The Act allows private
citizens, including foreign nationals, to bring claims against the
34. At the outset, it should be noted that the FTCA is only one of several ways that
PMCs can attempt to avoid liability for certain tort claims. A more extended discussion
that addresses the merits of each of these alternatives separately is beyond the scope of
this Comment, but other potential defenses include: (1) the political question doctrine, see,
e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-37 (1962) (discussing justiciability and the six-factor
test used today to determine if a political question bars courts from hearing certain
claims); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217) (synthesizing Baker's six-factor analysis into
three major questions); (2) derivative sovereign immunity, see infra notes 41, 47; (3) law of
war immunity, see Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009); and, if the tort
claims involve a civilian contractor suing his employer, (4) immunity afforded by the
Defense Base Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1654 (2006) (precluding individual contractor
employees from asserting negligence claims against their employer for injuries arising out
of performance of a government contract outside of the United States); see also KBR I,
736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 956 n.2 (D. Md. 2010) (discussing the Defense Base Act), modified,
RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013).
For more analysis about the merits of using the political question doctrine in cases
involving PMCs, see generally Chris Jenks, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Government
Contractor Battlefield Tort Liability and the Political Question Doctrine, 28 BERKELEY J.
INTL L. 178 (2010) (discussing the varying application of political question doctrine in
PMC cases and recommending a three-pronged inquiry where courts may better assess if a
PMC should be afforded protection under the doctrine); Kristen L. Richer, Note, The
Functional Political Question Doctrine and the Justiciability of Employee Tort Suits Against
Military Service Contractors, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694 (2010) (discussing the two primary
ways that courts have applied the doctrine to PMCs, what the author refers to as the
"justiciable-as-is" and "absolutist" approaches).
For more information on the merits of using law of war immunity with PMCs, see
generally John F. O'Connor, Contractor Tort Immunity Under the Law of Military
Occupation, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 367 (2009) (arguing for the use of a law
of war immunity for PMCs involving in wartime activities).
35. The Federal Tort Claims Act was originally the short title of Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812. Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was repealed and reenacted in scattered sections
of Title 28. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 2401, 2402,2411, 2671-2680 (2006)).
36. See KBR 1, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 963 ("[T]he United States as a sovereign is immune
from suit except under those limited circumstances in which it has waived that
immunity.... [T]he United States waived its immunity to tort suits under certain
conditions and subject to the exceptions set forth in the FTCA." (citations omitted)).
37. Foreign nationals may be able to bring FTCA actions in U.S. federal courts based
on federal question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, or the Alien Tort Statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (federal question); id. § 1332(a)(2), (3) (2006 & Supp. 2011)
(diversity); id. § 1350 (2006) (Alien Tort Statute).
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government in federal courts.3 There are exceptions found in the
FTCA, however, that reserve the United States's sovereign immunity
in certain tort claims and effectively bar individuals from bringing suit
in those instances.39
Importantly, the statute does not extend immunity to
contractors. 40 Thus, contractors cannot make claims of derivative
sovereign immunity41 under the FTCA's exceptions.4 2 Yet courts have
extended some of the FTCA's exceptions to PMCs in such a way that,
depending on the facts, preempts certain state tort law claims 43 against
a PMC if the state tort law" is found to "disturb, interfere with, or
seriously compromise the purposes of the [FTCA's exceptionsl." 45
Practically, the difference between a contractor's successful use
of derivative sovereign immunity or federal preemption leads to the
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011) ("[D]istrict courts . .. shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.").
39. See id. § 2680(a)-(n) (2006) (precluding liability in a range of areas, including
claims relating to the transmission of postal matter, certain collections of taxes, and the
fiscal operations of the Department of the Treasury).
40. See id. § 2671 ("[T]he term 'Federal agency' includes the executive departments,
the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments
of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of
the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States." (emphasis
added)).
41. "Derivative sovereign immunity protects agents of the sovereign from liability for
carrying out the sovereign's will." AI-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 736 (D. Md.
2010), rev'd sub nom. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on
reh'g en banc sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
42. See KBR I, 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 964 (D. Md. 2010), modified, RWT 09MD2083,
2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27,2013).
43. The Constitution's Supremacy Clause permits federal laws to preempt state laws
in certain circumstances. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States .. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
44. Note that there still remains a threshold question about which country or state's
choice-of-law principles apply in the context of alleged injuries occurring in foreign
countries, but this discussion falls beyond the scope of this Comment. For an idea of how
complicated choice-of-law principles can become in wartime suits, see generally Harris v.
Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 642 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (denying PMC's
motion to apply Iraqi law in proceedings relating to injuries sustained by plaintiff's
decedent while stationed in Iraq).
45. City of Morgan City v. S. La. Elec. Co-op. Ass'n, 31 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1994).
Morgan City also gives a good overview of the ways the federal government may preempt
state law. See id. at 321-22.
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same result for an individual plaintiff-the plaintiff's claim is
dismissed. The difference is more important for contractors, however.
They could still find themselves subject to criminal liability or other
punitive harm, provided that only private citizens' tort claims are
preempted,46 and courts do not grant immunity to the contractors on
other grounds.
B. The FTCA's Discretionary Function and Combatant Activities
Exceptions Apply to PMCs: Enter Boyle, Koohi, Saleh, and Al
Shimari
1. Discretionary Function Exception
Two specific FTCA exceptions have been extended to PMCs.
The first is the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.4 8 The
exception, in part, states that private citizens cannot bring a tort suit
for any claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . .. whether or
not the discretion involved be abused."4 9 The Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.so first brought
contractors under the guise of the FTCA by using the discretionary
function exception." This approach, which preempts state tort law
46. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006 & Supp. 2009)
(imposing liability under the UCMJ for those "persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field" during a "declared war or a contingency operation"); 18 U.S.C.
§ 7(9)(A) (2006) (extending the United States's special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction to "the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other
United States Government missions or entities in foreign States" such that civilian
contractors in these areas could be held liable); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006) (imposing
liability for Americans who commit or attempt to commit torture); War Crimes Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (imposing liability for armed forces personnel and U.S.
nationals who commit war crimes, including grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention); Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3261(a)(1) (2006) (imposing liability for those "employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States" for conduct that "would constitute an offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
47. For a useful discussion of the ways a contractor could assert derivative sovereign
immunity, see KBR I, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 963-74.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
51. This does not mean that contractors now have the full protection of all of the
FTCA's exceptions. Rather, courts have determined that only the discretionary function
exception (and, in some jurisdictions, the combatant activities exceptions) apply to
contractors under the appropriate circumstances. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying
text. As the Boyle Court first indicated, "It makes little sense to insulate the Government
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claims, is now widely known as the "government contractor
defense."5 2
In Boyle, the Court held that the FTCA's discretionary function
exception preempted a wrongful death claim against a contractor"
who the U.S. government hired to manufacture helicopter escape
hatches-one of which was alleged to have been defectively designed
and repaired, ultimately leading to a pilot's drowning.54 To reach this
result, the Court first noted that contractors could be immunized
from suit even in lieu of any contractor-specific legislation." The
Court then proffered a two-step preemption analysis to determine if
the case against the contractor would be barred.
First, the Court asked if an area involving "uniquely federal
interests"" was implicated with the issue at bar;" it found such
interests were present in Boyle." In its second step, the Court asked
whether there was a "significant conflict" between the state law and
the related federal policy or interest." Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, placed this potential conflict as between state tort law and
the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.o The Court
ultimately held that this exception applied to the contractor in Boyle
and that the state tort laws involved would significantly conflict with
against financial liability" when it conducts an activity by itself, "but not when it contracts"
for those same services. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
52. See, e.g., KBR 1, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
53. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13.
54. Id. at 502 (describing how the pilot crashed his helicopter into the ocean, alive at
that point, but was then unable to remove himself from the escape hatch and ultimately
drowned).
55. See id. at 504.
56. Id.
57. See id. (asking whether these uniquely federal interests are "so committed ... to
federal control that state law is preempted and replaced . . . by the courts-so-called
'federal common law' ").
58. See id. at 507 (noting that U.S. contract obligations and pricing concerns would be
implicated if contractors were subject to greater liability).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 509-12 (rejecting the use of the Feres Doctrine as the limiting principle
for finding a "significant conflict" here, as the Fourth Circuit had done, noting this
produces results both "too broad and ... too narrow"). The Feres Doctrine, as it is now
known, prevents military service members from suing the government to recover damages
for injuries sustained in the course of military service. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
146 (1950); see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (describing the Feres Doctrine). Before the
Supreme Court heard the Boyle case, the Fourth Circuit used Feres to mark a "significant
conflict" between federal and state law and policy interests since the Feres doctrine would
normally bar claims like this if military personnel were directly trying to sue the
government. See id. at 509-10 (citing Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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this exception.61 Recognizing that this two-step analysis could displace
many viable claims against PMCs,62 the Court limited the reach of its
analysis by holding that the discretionary function exception
preempted claims arising out of design defects against manufacturers
only when contractors gained approval from the federal government
for their design, adhered to the specifications, and properly warned
about the design risks involved. The contractor in Boyle met all of
these elements.'
2. Combatant Activities Exception
Courts have also conferred a second FTCA exception on PMCs:
the combatant activities exception. Flowing from Boyle's two-step
reasoning, but separate from the government contractor defense, a
court would need to find uniquely federal interests involved in a case
and then judge if a state tort law would be in "significant conflict"
with the FTCA's combatant activities exception in order for a
contractor to rightly fit within this exception.66 Generally, the
exception bars tort claims "arising out of the combatant activities of
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war."67
While a few courts have narrowly construed what qualifies as a
combatant activity,' most others have followed the approach
outlined in Johnson v. United States' and ruled that combatant
activities include "not only physical violence, but activities both
necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostilities."" In
61. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (explaining the detailed level of considerations that
federal government made in its design specifications with the contractor, and that a tort
suit would involve second-guessing of these actions).
62. See id. at 512-13 (outlining three steps to appropriately balance the "scope of
displacement" between viable tort claims and "protect[ing] discretionary functions").
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. The government contractor defense only refers to the preempting of tort claims
under the FTCA's discretionary function exception. See KBR 1, 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 965
(D. Md. 2010), modified, RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27,2013).
66. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp, 580 F.3d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
68. See, e.g., Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947)
(determining that an "exercise of physical force" is needed to qualify as a combatant
activity).
69. 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948).
70. Id. at 770; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Al
Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (2012) (Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921)
("[Dlistrict court decisions are generally consistent with the Ninth Circuit's [combatant
activities] standard in Johnson . . . .").
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addition, courts have not read the exception to require a formal
congressional declaration of warn for "purposes of domestic tort
law."7 2
Prior to Saleh and Al Shimari, a limited set of products liability
cases used the exception, beginning in the Ninth Circuit with Koohi v.
United States.' In Koohi, a U.S. warship using an air defense system
designed by a defense manufacturer mistakenly shot down travelers
aboard an Iranian passenger plane during the Iraq-Iran "tanker
war."74 The Ninth Circuit held that the combatant activities exception
preempted the negligence and design defect claims that the plaintiffs,
who were heirs of the decedents, brought against the United States
and the PMCs." In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit painted
the depth of the combatant activities exception in broad strokes:
The combatant activities exception applies whether. . . forces
hit a prescribed or an unintended target, whether those
selecting the target act wisely or foolishly, whether the missiles
we employ turn out to be "smart" or dumb, whether the target
we choose performs the function we believe it does or whether
our choice of an object for destruction is a result of error or
miscalculation. In other words, it simply does not matter for
purposes of the "time of war" exception whether the military
makes or executes its decisions carefully or negligently,
properly or improperly. It is the nature of the act and not the
manner of its performance that counts. Thus, for purposes of
liability under the FTCA, ... the only question that need be
answered is whether the challenged action constituted
combatant activity during time of war."
Given the wide reach of the combatant activities exception
outlined in Koohi, many courts have either criticized it as an
71. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11 ("[The Congress shall have Power to] declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water."); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that in
not requiring a formal declaration of war in order for the combatant activities exception to
apply, the court was "strongly influenced by the fact that in modern times hostilities have
occurred without a formal declaration of war far more frequently than following a formal
pronouncement").
72. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335.
73. 976 F.2d 1328.
74. See id. at 1335.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1335-36.
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unfounded expansion of Boyle's reasoning7 or refused to extend the
exception in non-products liability cases.
3. Expanding the Combatant Activities Exception: Saleh and
Al Shimari
The D.C. Circuit's Saleh v. Titan Corp. 9 decision in 2009 and,
two years later, a Fourth Circuit panel's decision in Al Shimari v.
CACI International, Inc.,80  adopted a broader reading of the
combatant activities exception. Both Saleh and Al Shimari emerged
from the same set of facts: Iraqi nationals alleged that PMCs abused
and tortured them at Iraq's infamous Abu Ghraib prison."1
Defendants were Titan Corporation ("Titan") and CACI
International ("CACI"), PMCs that provided interpreters and
interrogators who worked in concert with military personnel.8 2
Accusations against the PMCs included that their personnel beat
77. See Getz v. Boeing Co., No. C 07-06396 CW, 2009 WL 636039, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2009) (criticizing two earlier district court cases, Flanigan ex rel. Flanigan v.
Westwind Techs., 648 F. Supp. 2d 994 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) and Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1993), that "expanded the doctrine" of when to use the
combatant activities exception outlined in Koohi); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2006) ("Until Congress directs otherwise, private,
non-employee contractors are limited to the government contractor defense and Boyle's
preemption analysis. Unless they qualify as employees or agents of the Government,
private contractors may not bootstrap the Government's sovereign immunity.");
Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 (N.D. Ga.
2006) ("Koohi represents an expansion of the holding in Boyle that the Supreme Court
may or may not have intended.").
78. See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615-16 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(finding that there must be a claim relating to defective products before the combatant
activities exception can possibly apply to the defendants).
79. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
80. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir.
2012). The very day Al Shimari was decided, the same Fourth Circuit panel released
another decision. See Al Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated
on reh'g en banc sub nom., Al Shimari v. CACI Intern., Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir.
2012). The Fourth Circuit panel fully explained its reasoning about using the combatant
activities exception in Al Shimari, and its holding also applied to Al Quraishi. See Al
Quraishi, 657 F.3d at 203. As such, this Comment will only refer to the Al Shimari case
when assessing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. Regardless, Al Quraishi is distinguished
from Al Shimari and Saleh in two ways. First, Titan (now known as L-3 Services)
interpreters did not contest the fact that they were present in the room when alleged
abusive interrogations were taking place. See id. at 202. Second, Iraqi nationals brought
suit from over twenty prisons in Iraq that included Titan workers, not just Abu Ghraib.
See id.
81. See generally Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10,
2004, at 42 (discussing U.S. officials' abuse of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib).
82. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 416; Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2.
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prisoners continuously, released attack dogs in the prison, and caused
the death of at least one detainee.13
Each court used Boyle's two-step preemption analysis to reach
its conclusions. Following Boyle's first step, as discussed more fully in
Al Shimari, the uniquely federal interests involved in these Abu
Ghraib cases were numerous.84 The Fourth Circuit panel first
highlighted the probability of greater costs to the government for
using contractors during combat operations without greater liability
protection.85 The panel next expressed disquiet at trying to conduct
civil proceedings in the middle of a war, which could likely involve
removing military personnel from the battlefield to resolve tort
disputes in court" and stifling the government's use of intelligence
gathering techniques."
In step two of their Boyle-based analyses, both courts found a
"significant conflict" between the combatant activities exception and
local tort law." In using the combatant activities exception instead of
Boyle's government contractor defense, the D.C. Circuit noted that
the conflict between state law and the combatant activities exception
relates to the "imposition per se" of tort law on the battlefield." As
first noted in Koohi, the D.C. Circuit underscored the point that the
"very purposes of tort law... conflict with the pursuit of warfare"'
and that "battle-field preemption"" of plaintiffs' tort claims was
necessary.
Both circuit courts also espoused Boyle's distress over the "scope
of displacement"9 2 of viable tort law claims against the interests
83. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 18-19 (Garland, J., dissenting).
84. The Saleh court noted that there was no dispute between the parties that uniquely
federal interests were involved, and so did not focus on this step of the analysis. See id. at 6
(majority opinion).
85. Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 418.
86. See id
87. See id
88. At this point in both court proceedings, choice-of-law issues had not been
resolved. The D.C. Circuit, in particular, appeared skeptical about whether local tort law
would apply if the claim moved forward. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 ("[W]e are still puzzled at
what interest D.C., or any state, would have in extending its tort law onto a foreign
battlefield."); see also supra note 44 (noting the extent of complications involving choice-
of-law principles in wartime suits).
89. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7; see also Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334-35 (9th
Cir. 1992) (noting that the three main principles of tort law are contrary to wartime
actions-namely, incentivizing the actor to be careful, providing remedies for innocent
victims of wrongful conduct, and punishing people for their wrongdoings).
90. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7.
91. Id.
92. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
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embedded in the combatant activities exception.93 To that end, the
D.C. Circuit, and later the Fourth Circuit, held that, "[d]uring
wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into
combatant activities over which the military retains command
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor's engagement in
such activities shall be preempted."' The cases ultimately held that
Titan and CACI were integrated in combatant activities in such a
way. The contractors from both companies worked "side by side in
questioning detainees,"95 and followed purported guidelines from the
Secretary of Defense about "aggressive interrogation techniques."96
Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit also held the plaintiffs' claims
preempted because the Constitution exclusively allocates war powers
to the federal government.9 7
Recently, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the Fourth
Circuit panel's Al Shimari opinion." It held that the Fourth Circuit
appeal should not have been heard in the first place under the
collateral order doctrine. 99 The en banc panel remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings.'" KBR will presumably
renew its original motions to dismiss, including dismissal based on the
combatant activities exception."o' Still, the Fourth Circuit panel's
93. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2012); Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8.
94. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added); see also Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420 ("We
hold that under these circumstances, where a civilian contractor is integrated into wartime
combatant activities over which the military broadly retains command authority, tort
claims arising out of the contractors' engagement in such activities are preempted.").
95. Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 418.
96. Id. at 416 (noting that, at one point, it became unclear which techniques remained
authorized by the Secretary of Defense).
97. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 11. A closer examination of the constitutional preemption
analysis in Saleh falls outside the scope of this Comment.
98. See Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 212.
99. See id. at 213 ("[T]he only way we may be entitled to review the orders on [this]
appeal is if they are among 'that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.' " (citations omitted)); see
also id. at 212-14 (discussing the collateral order doctrine in this case).
100. See id. at 224.
101. A similar scenario occurred in Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 878
F. Supp. 2d 543 (W.D. Pa. 2012). The trial court first denied KBR's motions to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 566-67. The Third Circuit then rejected KBR's
appeal under the collateral order doctrine and remanded to the trial court for discovery
proceedings. See id. at 566-67. After discovery, KBR renewed its appeals to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 546-47. This time, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss on both political question and combatant activities exception grounds.
See id at 548.
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reasoning is incredibly useful since it presents a potential analytical
framework for Fourth Circuit district courts-or another Fourth
Circuit panel-to use in future combatant activities exception cases.102
II. APPLYING SALEH AND AL SHIMARITO BASIC SUPPORT
SERVICES: THE KBR CASES
A host of ongoing cases involving KBR (collectively, the "KBR
cases") unpack the D.C. and Fourth Circuits' holdings in varying ways
to the service-contracting giant and, by extension, to future basic
support service providers. After a brief overview of KBR's role in
Iraq and Afghanistan, this Part explores two different groups of cases
after Saleh and Al Shimari: (1) one group that has applied, or seemed
amenable to, the combatant activities exception for KBR, and (2)
another group of cases that has viewed KBR's services as outside of
the scope of the combatant activities exception. This Part concludes
by identifying the outstanding issues surrounding the combatant
activities exception that will be studied more fully in Part III.
A. Overview of KBR's Role with the U.S. Military
In 2001 and 2007, KBR was awarded contracts through the third
and fourth iterations of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
("LOGCAP").o10 LOGCAP III and IV were "limited competition
wartime services contracts"10 that allowed the government to buy
goods and services over the course of several years from LOGCAP
participants alone."os Under its LOGCAP contracts, KBR
"maintained and ran services at war-zone bases [in Iraq and
Afghanistan], including dining, recreation, showers, housing and
laundry facilities."'" Each military base's "Mayor's Cell" (a team of
102. In fact, Judge Duncan's concurring en banc opinion recommended that district
courts "give due consideration to the appellant's immunity and preemption arguments,"
suggesting that she would have sided with the defendants had the Fourth Circuit been able
to initially hear the case. See Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 224 (Duncan, J., concurring).
103. See Weinberger, supra note 23. For more information on the development of
LOGCAP, see Dennis C. Clements & Margaret A. Young, The History of the Army's
Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program: An Analysis of Its Oversight from Past to
Present 13-20 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished M.B.A. Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate
School), available at http://oai.dtic.mil/oailoai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=
html&identifier=ADA443282.
104. See Weinberger, supra note 23.
105. LOGCAP III was awarded exclusively to KBR, while LOGCAP IV was awarded
to KBR, Dyncorp, and Fluor Corporation. See id.
106. Elise Castelli, Auditor: 'Unprecedented' Fraud in LOGCAP III, FED. TIMES, May
11, 2009, available at http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20090511/DEPARTMENTS01/
905110302/1034/ITO4.
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military personnel who essentially run a particular military base)
oversaw and prioritized many of the tasks KBR's workers
completed. 107
The LOGCAP has made KBR the largest American military
contractor in Iraq,08 and has proven very lucrative for the company.
In fact, KBR's services rendered under LOGCAP III alone have cost
the U.S. government over thirty-seven billion dollars.'o KBR's role
has generated controversy, particularly with the company's
misquoting of services from LOGCAP 111,11o and its subpar
performance of some of its tasks leading to injuries of U.S. military
personnel and contractors.'
B. The Expansive Approach to the Combatant Activities Exception:
Aiello, Harris, In re KBR, Inc., Taylor, and Carmichael
Five cases since the Saleh and Al Shimari decisions-Aiello v.
Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.,"2 Harris v. Kellogg, Brown &
Root Services, Inc.,11 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation,114 Taylor v.
Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.,1 s and Carmichael v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services, Inc." 6-have either applied the combatant
activities exception directly to KBR, or at least suggested that such a
defense could work in lieu of the political question doctrine.117 First,
in Aiello, an American civilian contractor brought negligence claims
against KBR for the injuries he suffered after falling to the ground
inside of a toilet facility that KBR was in charge of building and
maintaining at Camp Shield military base in Baghdad, Iraq.118 As a
forward operating base, Camp Shield was a re-arming point for
military forces involved in combat,"' and activities at the base
107. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 714-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
108. See T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 4,
2007, at Al ("KBR is by far the largest employer of Americans [in Iraq], with nearly
14,000 U.S. workers.").
109. See Weinberger, supra note 23.
110. See Castelli, supra note 106 (noting the government's recommendation to reduce
KBR's proposed or billed costs by over four billion dollars).
111. See infra Part II.B-II.C.
112. 751 F. Supp. 2d 698.
113. 878 F. Supp. 2d 543 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
114. RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27,2013).
115. 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011).
116. 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009).
117. For more information on the political question doctrine, see supra note 34.
118. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
119. See id. at 701-02.
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included "supporting the transition of the Iraqi government, training
Iraqi police officers, and providing internal security in Iraq."120
Tracking Boyle's two-part analysis and Saleh's reasoning, the court
first found that uniquely federal interests were implicated with the
combatant activities exception-specifically, the need to eliminate
tort from the battlefield and preempt state or foreign regulation of
federal wartime conduct"-and, next, that the FTCA exception
brought significant conflict with state tort law claims. 122
Following Saleh's (and, later, Al Shimari's) lead regarding the
need to limit the "scope of displacement" of such an all-encompassing
preemption, 2 3 the Aiello court also found that latrine services were,
indeed, a combatant activity and part of the military's broad
command authority. In this case, the court rested its combatant
activity analysis on the fact that KBR workers were providing "active
logistical support of combat operations," 24 given the dangers and the
nature of operations conducted by PMCs and troops alike at Camp
Shield.12 ' The court also pointed to KBR's services under the
LOGCAP and under the watch of the base's Mayor's Cell to
conclude that there was military command authority over KBR's
workers. 126
Reflecting Aiello's logic, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Harris found that the plaintiff
estate's claims against KBR were barred by both the political
question doctrine and the combatant activities exception.' 7 The case
involved an Army staff sergeant who was electrocuted in the shower
at his base camp due to faulty electrical wiring emanating from a
water pump operated by KBR. " The Harris court looked broadly at
the water and electricity services KBR provided on the base to find
that such activities were directly connected and integrated with the
military's combatant activities. 12 9 Specifically, the court noted KBR's
120. Id. at 701.
121. See id. at 710.
122. See id at 711.
123. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Just as in Boyle,
however, the 'scope of displacement' of the preempted non-federal substantive law must
be carefully tailored so as to coincide with the bounds of the federal interest being
protected.").
124. Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (citation omitted).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 714-15.
127. Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 (W.D.
Pa. 2012).
128. See id at 546-47.
129. Id. at 595-96.
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overall "life support functions" to the base and its electrical facilities
that "helped to protect soldiers from enemy attacks."' It also found
that, under Aiello's reading of the combatant activities exception, the
military's control of the "terms and conditions of the contract" was
enough to view KBR under military command authority."'
Even KBR's trash services were subject to litigation. In re KBR,
Inc., Burn Pit Litigation 3 2 was a set of consolidated pretrial hearings
against KBR133 where military servicemen and servicewomen alleged
that they suffered injuries due to their exposure to contaminated
water and to toxic emissions from burn pitsl3 4 -open-air pits used to
burn waste at certain military bases 131-that KBR oversaw at
"literally hundreds of locations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan."' 6
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
dismissed all claims against KBR under the political question
doctrine, derivative sovereign immunity, and the combatant activities
exception.1 7 In its combatant activities analysis, the district court
found that waste services and clean water maintenance did "arise out
of combatant activities of the military."13 Like Harris, the district
court quoted extensively from Aiello to back its finding that
"mundane questions of waste disposal and water supply"139 were
indeed connected with combatant activities. 40 The court also believed
that KBR had shown the necessary military command authority due
to the military's "direct and fundamental .. . management and control
of KBR employees in both theatres of war."141
130. Id. at 595.
131. Id. at 596-97.
132. RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013).
133. See id. at *3 ("Forty-four of the pending cases purport to be nationwide class
actions, while thirteen assert claims only for the named Plaintiffs. Thirty-seven of the cases
were filed in federal courts, while twenty were filed in state courts and removed to federal
courts. All of the cases have been transferred to this Court for consolidated pretrial
proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation... ." (footnote omitted)).
134. See id at *2.
135. See J. Malcolm Garcia, Smoke Signals, OXFORD AM., Aug. 24, 2011, at 136-37
("The pits incinerate discarded human body parts, plastics, hazardous medical material,
lithium batteries, tires, hydraulic fluids, and vehicles. Jet fuel keeps pits burning twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week.").
136. See KBR II, 2013 WL 709826, at *2.
137. See id. at *12, *13, *18.
138. Id. at *16.
139. Id. at *2.
140. See id. at *17-18.
141. Id. at *8 (discussing the "military control" factor under the court's political
question analysis).
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Separately, in Taylor, a Fourth Circuit panel held that the
political question doctrinel and, alternatively, the combatant
activities exception,143 barred a Marine's negligence claims against
KBR's technicians-in charge of providing electrical wiring
maintenance and repair to a base located in Fallujah, Iraq"-who
went ahead, even after the Marines' warnings, to restore power back
to the main generator in an area of the base housing tanks and other
assault vehicles.'45 Since the Marines were attempting, concurrently,
to install a makeshift wiring box in the vehicle area, the main
generator's restoration of power caused a surge of electricity to enter
the wiring box, and, tragically, led to a Marine's electrocution and
other injuries.14 6 A majority of the Fourth Circuit panel considered
KBR's services combatant activities.147 As more fully explained in the
lower court's opinion, KBR's electrical generation helped sustain an
area made for tank and assault vehicle maintenancel48-no doubt
vehicles used to engage in combat operations-and their services
were conducted at a base subject to regular mortar attacks.4 9 In sum,
the court believed that KBR's services were "necessary to and in
direct connection with actual hostilities.""'o
The issue over military command authority in Taylor, however,
was a bit more muddled, given the splintered Fourth Circuit opinion.
Two of the judges upheld the use of the combatant activities
exception without discussing the military command authority exerted
over KBR. 1 Presumably, these two judges would agree with the
lower court's assertion that KBR was under military command
authority, even when the physical actions of its personnel were not
being controlled, since KBR was "operating at all times under orders
142. For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see supra note 34.
143. Two judges of the three-judge panel agreed that the political question doctrine
applied, see Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 403, 413 (4th Cir.
2011), while two judges (one overlapping justice from the political question issue holding)
believed that the combatant activities exception should apply, see id. at 413 (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 413 (Shedd, J., concurring). The opinion, thus, has alternative grounds
for judgment.
144. See id. at 403 (majority opinion).
145. See id. at 404.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 413 (Shedd, J., concurring).
148. See Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-341, 2010 WL
1707530, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 658 F.3d 402, 403 (4th Cir. 2011).
149. See id.
150. See id (quoting Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948)).
151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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and determinations made by the military."' 52 The remaining judge in
his political question analysis, however, explicitly stated the military
did not employ "plenary control"' over KBR and that KBR was
"nearly insulated from direct military control"154 in its generator
maintenance duties.155
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit's Carmichael decision held that the
political question doctrine barred a serviceman's claims against the
KBR driver of a convoy."' The driver failed to navigate a circuitous
route outside a base in Balad, Iraq, causing the vehicle to roll over
and nearly crush the serviceman who was in the car with the driver at
the time.'s Despite the use of the political question doctrine in
Carmichael, the opinion sheds additional light on the issue of military
command authority that could be used to sustain a combatant
activities exception claim. Notably, the court discarded the plaintiff's
notion that the driver's physical control of the convoy somehow
alleviated the fact that the military's "orders and determinations""
guided the driver's actions "at all times." 59
C. The Narrow Approach to the Combatant Activities Exception:
Bixby, McManaway, and Lessin
Just as those cases bolstered KBR's attempts to employ the
combatant activities exception, three other cases disparaged KBR's
preemption arguments. In both Bixby v. KBR, Inc.1"o and
McManaway v. KBR, Inc. 161 two different district courts 62 found that
152. See Taylor, 2010 WL 1707530, at *7 (quoting Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown &
Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009)).
153. See Taylor, 658 F.3d at 411.
154. See id.
155. Judge King still believed the political question doctrine applied since the "merits
of Taylor's negligence claim would require the judiciary to question 'actual, sensitive
judgments made by the military;' " namely, the Mayor's Cell's decisions about which areas
of the base would have backup generators, and the Marines' actions in deciding to install a
wiring box in the first place. See id. at 411-12 (citation omitted).
156. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1275.
157. See id. at 1277-78.
158. Id. at 1284.
159. Id. at 1284 n.10 ("[The driver's] conduct was at all times governed by military
rules and regulations (including timing, route, speed, and spacing), and any attempt to
assess the reasonableness of Irvine's conduct would entail an examination of those rules
and regulations.").
160. 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Or. 2010).
161. CIV.A. H-10-1044, 2012 WL 6033259 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2012).
162. Bixby was decided by the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. McManaway was decided by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *1.
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claims from former National Guard members against KBR were not
barred by the political question doctrine, Boyle's government
contractor defense, or the combatant activities exception.16 1 In both
cases, former servicemen alleged negligence and fraud claims against
KBR's workers, who, contrary to their contract with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers," failed to inform officials of and take protective
actions against environmental hazards at the Qarmat Ali water plant
in Iraq.165  KBR's workers had discovered levels of sodium
dichromate, a hazardous carcinogen, and waited over three months to
alert troops who were stationed there, which ultimately led to these
lawsuits for injuries.16
Observing precedents under the combatant activities exception,
including Saleh, the Bixby court found that KBR's actions were not
combatant activities."16 To reach this conclusion, the court focused on
the activities occurring at the water plant, detached from the plant's
role in the larger Iraq war efforts.168 The court established that KBR's
workers, though operating in a dangerous area, 169 supported "the goal
of restoring Iraqi oil-production capacity, manifestly a foreign-policy-
related goal rather than a combatant activity. That is, the defendants'
operations were more akin to restoring the battlefield to productive
use after the battle has ended than to aiding warriors to 'swing the
sword.' """o The McManaway court adopted Bixby's reasoning
entirely in reaching the same conclusion about the lack of a
combatant activity.171 In a later motion to dismiss the Bixby case, the
trial court also found that the military did not carry broad command
authority, as Saleh imagined, under performance-based service
contracts. 172
The third case that found against KBR was another convoy
service case, Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services,7 1 which was
resolved shortly before Saleh. The United States District Court for
163. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9-10; Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. The
McManaway case did not specifically address the government contractor defense
argument.
164. See Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1229,1231.
165. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *2; Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32.
166. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *2; Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.




171. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9.
172. See Bixby v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-632-PK, 2012 WL 3776473, at *5 (D. Or.
Aug. 29,2012).
173. No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12,2006).
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the Southern District of Texas found, under facts similar to those in
Carmichael,17 4 that neither the political question doctrine nor the
combatant activities exception applied."' The Lessin court noted that
the service member's injuries essentially resulted from a traffic
accident,'7 6 and that military decision-making would not be implicated
since KBR was only providing a convoy service on the battlefield.17
D. Divergent Applications of Saleh and Al Shimari
The KBR cases show how vague Saleh's and Al Shimari's
holdings are to basic support service contractors. Before offering a
more structured way to parse these respective issues, this Comment
briefly catalogs how the KBR cases applied the key aspects of the
D.C. and Fourth Circuits' holdings.
1. Unique Federal Interests and Significant Conflict with
State Tort Law
No case raises major issues-regardless of whether the
combatant activities exception applies-in finding "uniquely federal
interests" and a "direct conflict" between the state tort law and the
combatant activities exception." As outlined in Al Shimari, issues
over increased costs, litigation involving military personnel, and the
larger goal of eliminating tort from the battlefield all confirm that the
federal interests here are unique and that viable tort suits could
conflict with the goals of the combatant activities exception." 9 Hence,
a significant conflict will plainly arise between these unique federal
interests and state tort law.
2. Combatant Activity
A more marked disagreement appears among courts over
whether KBR's services constitute a "combatant activity." As stated
earlier, most courts define combatant activities as including not only
"physical violence, but activities both necessary to and in direct
174. The notable distinction between Lessin and Carmichael was the fact that the
service member in Lessin was assisting the driver in repairing the malfunctioning truck in
the midst of their service route when the ramp assist arm of the truck injured him. See id.
at *1.
175. See id. at *3-5.
176. See id at *3.
177. See id. at *4.
178. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,504 (1988).
179. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
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connection with actual hostilities."" These activities could include
"active logistical support of combat operations."'
Cases like Aiello, Harris, In re KBR, Inc., and Taylor exemplify
the view that combatant activities include KBR's support services like
latrine maintenance, water pump flow, waste disposal, and electrical
wiring." To reach this conclusion, these courts looked at the actual
services KBR provided but were ultimately swayed by the context in
which these services were executed. In particular, these courts
examined the types of operations that were widely executed at the
respective military bases, their role in larger combat operations, and
the dangers faced at each of the bases by attacks from outside
forces.18
In contrast, cases like Bixby, McManaway, and Lessin doubted
that KBR's services were covered under the exception. Bixby and
McManaway divorced the water plant's role from the larger
battlefield in Iraq" and looked at the goals of Iraqi oil production
within the plant itself." This separation allowed the courts to
sidestep any likely combatant activities exception analysis.1 6 The trial
court in Lessin, too, rebuffed the argument that driver services were
related to physical force or actual hostilities."
3. Military Command Authority
The KBR cases also raise questions about whether the military
exerted enough command authority over KBR's conduct to qualify
KBR for the combatant activities exception. Aiello, In re KBR, Inc.,
180. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948); see also Brief
for the United States, supra note 70, at 18-19 ("[D]istrict court decisions are generally
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's [combatant activities] standard in Johnson .....
181. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 768,770.
182. See KBR 11, 2013 WL 709826, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013); Harris v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2012); Aiello v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Taylor v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-341, 2010 WL 1707530, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16,
2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011).
183. See KBR II, 2013 WL 709826, at *17-18; Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 595-97; Aiello,
751 F. Supp. 2d at 713; Taylor, 2010 WL 1707530, at *10.
184. See Reply in Support of Defendants Haliburton Co. and Haliburton Energy
Servs., Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss at 7, Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Or.
2010) (No. 09-cv-632-PK), 2011 WL 1791574 (quoting a general who stated that KBR's
conduct occurred in a "combat environment").
185. See McManaway v. KBR, Inc., CIV.A. H-10-1044, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 4,2012); Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
186. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *10; Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
187. See Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556,
at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006).
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Taylor, and Carmichael held that an appreciable amount of military
control existed over the PMCs generally, particularly under the guise
of the LOGCAP, the Mayor's Cell, and other extensive rules and
regulations for PMC services at military bases through Iraq and
Afghanistan.8'
Bixby and the earlier-decided Lessin case, however, held
otherwise. The trial court in Bixby believed that the performance-
based statement of work used in the KBR service contract, on its
own, did not mark the military's "specific control over the actions and
decisions of the contractor"' 9 since such contracts relate to results
and not " 'how' the work is to be accomplished."" Lessin also gave
little credence to the command authority exerted by the rules and
regulations governing a PMC's services and instead centered on the
service provided. 9'
III. A PARTICULARIZED, CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE
COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION
Saleh and Al Shimari's growth of the combatant activities
exception fails to provide an adequate framework for courts to
analyze tort claims against PMCs providing basic support services. 192
A particularized, contextual approach to the combatant activities
exception best serves the holdings in Saleh and Al Shimari and the
competing interests involved in constructing a viable combatant
activities exception for PMCs. The approach urges courts to focus on
the PMC service and the setting involved in tort claims to settle
whether a PMC's actions are "combatant activities" under the FTCA
and applicable case law. After outlining the construction of this
approach in light of the Saleh and Al Shimari holdings and the
opposing interests involved when applying the combatant activities
exception to PMCs, Part III takes a closer look into the wisdom of the
proposed analytical framework.
188. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1284, 1298
(11th Cir. 2009); KBR II, 2013 WL 709826, at *8; Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Taylor,
2010 WL 1707530, at *7.
189. See Bixby v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-632-PK, 2012 WL 3776473, at *5 (D. Or.
Aug. 29,2012) (quoting Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F. 3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
190. Id. (quoting Saleh, 580 F.3d at 10). The McManaway court did not directly address
the issue of military command authority in its decision.
191. See Lessin, 2006 WL 3940556, at *4.
192. See SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (noting an increase in the
number of contractors providing security); supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
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A. Constructing the Framework for a Particularized, Contextual
Approach
1. Examining the Breadth and Guidance of the Holdings: Saleh's
Limiting Language, Broad Military Command Authority, and
Discerning What "Combatant Activity" Means
Though Saleh and Al Shimari expanded the reach of the
combatant activities exception to PMCs, additional limiting language
in Saleh makes clear that not every PMC activity on the battlefield
will always fall under the scope of the combatant activities exception:
During wartime, where a private service contractor is
integrated into combatant activities over which the military
retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the
contractor's engagement in such activities shall be preempted.
We recognize that a service contractor might be supplying
services in such a discrete manner-perhaps even in a battlefield
context-that those services could be judged separate and apart
from combat activities of the U.S. military."'
But Saleh's limiting language contains ambiguities as
demonstrated by the differing results in the KBR cases. Under one
reading, these words may imply that certain contractor services are
inherently "discrete" and that they will never meet the combatant
activities exception. This reasoning is underscored in Bixby and
McManaway,194 and, before Saleh, in Lessin.'"9 Then again, the words
may only imply that in certain contexts contractor services could be
discrete, while in others those same services could meet the
combatant activities exception. This thinking is underlined in cases
like Aiello,196 Harris," In re KBR, Inc.,' 8 and Taylor.'99
If the contextual approach from Aiello, Harris, In re KBR, Inc.,
and Taylor is followed, then another question to ask is what factors
make a PMC activity so "discrete" as to remain distinct from the
193. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added).
194. See McManaway v. KBR, Inc., CIV.A. H-10-1044, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 4,2012); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2010).
195. See Lessin, 2006 WL 3940556, at *4.
196. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 713
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
197. See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 594-96
(W.D. Pa. 2012).
198. See KRB II, RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826, at *17-18 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013).
199. See Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-341, 2010 WL
1707530, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011).
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combatant activities exception. Using the Saleh and Al Shimari
holdings as a guide, is it because the PMC service is not integrated
with "combatant activities" under the FTCA? Or alternatively,
because of a lack of military "command authority" over PMCs in
certain settings? Perhaps the answer is some combination of the two?
As discussed previously, there was never any doubt in Saleh and Al
Shimari that interrogations of potential Iraqi insurgents at the Abu
Ghraib prison were combatant activities, and so this issue was never
fully raised in those cases.200
There is little chance, however, that KBR's services, or those of
any other similarly positioned PMC, would be too "discrete" to fall
outside the combatant activities exception because of a lack of
military integration. While both Saleh and Al Shimari dealt with a
highly integrated setting between contractor and military personnel
working "side by side in questioning detainees,"20 ' the Saleh court
expressly rejected the need for exclusive military control over PMCs
to fit the combatant activities exception.202 Instead, the courts asked if
the military broadly retained "command authority."203 In both cases,
CACI employees' "dual chain of command," reporting both to
military commanders and their civilian supervisors, fell comfortably
within this broader command characterization."
In short, Saleh and Al Shimari suggest that if a PMC is: (1)
providing basic support services under military contract, (2) with
extensive military regulations and guidelines, and (3) under the guise
of the Mayor's Cell at each military base,20 s then the PMC is under
military command authority. Even purported PMC breaches of
service contracts would not break the broad military authority206
200. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also supra notes 81-83
and accompanying text (discussing the facts surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison
interrogations).
201. Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on reh'g
en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
202. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8 (rejecting the "exclusive operational control" test outlined
in Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007)).
203. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420; Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9.
204. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 4-5.
205. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 714-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
206. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 423 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) ("[Tihe fact that a
military interrogator applied techniques more aggressive than those approved by his
commander for aggressive interrogation would not remove the activity from the military
effort, any more than would a soldier's shooting an enemy soldier even after he had been
seized and disarmed.").
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Saleh and Al Shimari envision.207 As the court in Koohi bluntly stated,
"[I]t simply does not matter for purposes of the [combatant activities]
exception whether the military makes or executes its decisions
carefully or negligently, properly or improperly. It is the nature of the
act and not the manner of its performance that counts."2"
The only imaginable situation where a PMC could fall outside of
military command authority, it seems, would be for actions unrelated
to its government contract. To illustrate, take a PMC who is under a
service contract to manage latrines at a military base. Negligent
execution of latrine services would not portend a lack of military
command authority. But an assault and battery against another
contractor after working hours more strongly intimates that the PMC
was not under the broad command authority of the military during
this incident. *
This Comment's particularized, contextual construction accounts
for these understandings and obscurities. As Saleh's limiting language
makes evident, not all PMC activities in wartime may fall under the
combatant activities exception. 2 o And a much more durable
understanding of military command authority is recognized in both
Saleh and Al Shimari.2 11 There remains some tractability, however, on
the "combatant activity" portion of Saleh and Al Shimari. A
contextual approach to which PMC services are deemed "combatant
activities," then, could differentiate between PMC actions that should
be shielded from liability and those actions that should be left
unprotected from suit.
207. Pre-Saleh commentary envisioned a more rigid understanding of military
command authority before PMCs could qualify for tort preemption or immunity. See Ben
Davidson, Note, Liability on the Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought by Soldiers
Against Military Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 822 (2008); Kateryna L. Rakowsky,
Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government Contractor Defense
to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365,
396 (2006).
208. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1992).
209. The United States appeared to support this thinking in the en banc Al Shimari
hearing. See Brief for the United States, supra note 70, at 20 ("[Plreemption would
generally apply even if an employee of a contractor allegedly violated the terms of the
contract .. . as long as the alleged conduct at issue was within the scope of the contractual
relationship.... But preemption would not apply to conduct of a contractor employee
that is unrelated to the contractor's duties under the government contract."). Further
exploration of this hypothetical falls outside the scope of this Comment, however, since
none of the KBR cases discussed such unrelated contract incidents.
210. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
211. See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
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2. Competing Interests
In the shadows of resolving these uncertainties, there are very
real interests and concerns that spawn from expanding or narrowing
the scope of the combatant activities exception.2 12 Those who favor
broadly applying Saleh and Al Shimari would stress that, Saleh's
limiting language about the combatant activities exception aside, the
thrust of both opinions seeks to eliminate tort law generally from the
battlefield,2 13  where the "traditional rationales for tort law-
deterrence of risk-taking behavior, compensation of victims, and
punishment of tortfeasors-are singularly out of place in combat
situations, because risk-taking is the rule." 214 In addition, war powers
are the exclusive province of the federal government, 2 1s and
proceeding with lawsuits that may involve questioning military
212. Several recent articles have expressed concern over the expansion of the
combatant activities exception to PMCs. See Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns:
An Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 395, 458 (2009) (arguing for a limited combatant activities exception
that does not include a PMC's discretionary actions); Michael H. LeRoy, The New Wages
of War-Devaluing Death and Injury: Conceptualizing Duty and Employment in Combat
Zones, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 217,243-50 (2011) (discussing the "objectionable short-
term effects" of barring soldiers and civilians compensation arising out of PMC actions
and the options moving forward for tort claims); Abigail Clark, Note, Reclaiming the
Moral High Ground: U.S. Accountability for Contractor Abuses as a Means to Win Back
Hearts and Minds, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 709, 731-34 (2009) (noting that contractors would
not qualify for the exception in most recent cases); Davidson, supra note 207, at 831
(arguing that the expansion of the combatant activities exception to PMCs "misreads" the
Boyle case); Spencer R. Nelson, Comment, Establishing a Practical Solution for Tort
Claims Against Private Military Contractors: Analyzing the Federal Tort Claims Act's
"Combatant Activities Exception" Via a Circuit Split, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 109,
135-41 (2012) (arguing that the Koohi standard limits the use of the combatant activities
exception to instances where force is directed against the enemy "as a result of
authorized military action"); Rakowsky, supra note 207, at 396 (underscoring the need to
ensure that PMCs were following the military's order before extending various immunity
defenses to them). Other commentaries, however, suggest the importance of expanding
the exception to PMCs. See Aaron L. Jackson, Civilian Soldiers: Expanding the
Government Contractor Defense to Reflect the New Corporate Role in Warfare, 63 A.F. L.
REV. 211, 221-23 (2009) (discussing the policy reasons of expanding government
contractor immunities to PMCs); O'Connor, supra note 34, at 415 (noting how the federal
government has already considered the competing interests of barring tort claims during
wartime, and, therefore, the combatant activities exception should be extended to both
soldiers and PMCs alike); Trevor Wilson, Comment, Operation Contractor Shield:
Extending the Government Contractor Defense in Recognition of Modern Warfare
Realities, 83 TUL. L. REV. 255, 280 (2008) (noting the need for courts to expand the
existing government contractor defenses for PMCs in unique circumstances).
213. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7.
214. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7 (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.
1992)).
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3; id art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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commanders' behavior, or specific war strategies and activities, could
hamper war efforts.2 16
Moreover, Saleh and Al Shimari implicitly recognize the value
that PMCs have in modern American warfare.2 PMC services during
wartime have existed since the Revolutionary War.2 18 The plethora of
PMC services offered now, however, far exceeds those nascent
beginnings.' In fact, PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan have
outnumbered military troops, with the U.S. government hiring over
260,000 PMCs at a cost of over $206 billion to the federal
government. 220 These numbers are staggering and signal that the use
of PMCs will continue in future American wars. 22 1 Though the rigors
of training, supervision, and evaluation of military personnel justify
the immunities enjoyed by the Armed Forces, 22 2 the growing
importance and impact of PMCs in wartime should lodge doubt in
those who think PMCs are insignificant players unworthy of legal
protection in modern warfare.
But those favoring a narrower protection of PMCs under Saleh
and Al Shimari would highlight several concerns, too. They would
question whether the combatant activities exception should have ever
applied to PMCs in the first place, an issue that several lower courts
raised before Saleh.2 23 These early reservations should at least caution
against inflating the exception in future cases, particularly outside of
the products liability or interrogation context.224 Further suspicion is
warranted, too, when considering the limiting language of Saleh
216. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 418.
217. See KBR 1, 736 F. Supp. 2d 956, 956 (D. Md. 2010) ("[T]he role of government
contractors in combat zones has grown to an unprecedented degree in recent years with
the wars waged by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan."), modified, RWT
09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826 (D. Md. Feb. 27,2013).
218. See MOLLY DUNIGAN, VICTORY FOR HIRE 6-7 (2011) (discussing the use of
privateers in 1776).
219. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT'L AFFAIRS, EMPLOYING PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES 7 (2007) (PMCs offer "specialised services . . . [in] combat operations,
strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational and logistic support, training,
procurement and maintenance").
220. Richard Fontaine, Op-Ed., Pentagon Must Reshape Future Role of Private
Contractors, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 12, 2011, www.cnas.org/print/6958; see also David Isenberg,
Contractors in War Zones: Not Exactly "Contracting," TIME (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://nation.time.com/2012/10/09/contractors-in-war-zones-not-exactly-contracting (citing
a study that noted how contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2008 to 2011 made up
over fifty percent of the total force in both countries).
221. See Fontaine, supra note 220.
222. See 3 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUs, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 14A:6, at n.74 (2d ed. 2012).
223. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
2013] 1387
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
itself.22 s Ignoring this limiting language makes it possible that every
kind of PMC service could fit the exception as long as a PMC was
located at a military installation or in some way situated on the
battlefield. Covering every kind of service under the exception, in
turn, would severely curb the accountability of PMCs for their
tortious conduct.226
This possibility may not prove distressing in the abstract,
particularly if the lawsuits arise out of PMC actions allegedly harming
perceived enemies of the United States as in Koohi,227 Saleh, and Al
Shimari.22 8 But there is no distinction for plaintiffs who are apparent
allies or enemies of the United States under Saleh and Al Shimari.2 29
Put another way, the combatant activities exception can preempt
claims from Americans who suffered injuries on the battlefield in
their fight and support of wartime efforts-an outcome that may give
observers greater pause. 2' These unfavorable outcomes for injured
Americans encourage the need for a more fact-specific approach to
govern when a PMC may fit within the combatant activities
exception.
B. A Way Forward: Inquiring About the PMC Service and the
Setting of a Claim
A particularized, contextual approach to the combatant activities
exception best captures the Saleh and Al Shimari holdings and duly
balances competing interests about the scope of the combatant
activities exception. Courts should narrow the "battlefield" context
when resolving whether a particular service is supporting a
"combatant activity" under the FTCA, focusing on (1) how a service
225. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
226. Criminal liability for PMCs exists under federal law, see supra note 46, but, given
that the United States did not bring suit based on any of the torture claims arising from
the Saleh and Al Shimari cases, see Saleh, 580 F.3d at 10, it is unclear how likely it is that
the United States would prosecute a PMC for basic tort claims.
227. Koohi involved a passenger aircraft mistakenly believed to be an Iranian fighter
plane. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,1330 (9th Cir. 1992).
228. Saleh and Al Shimari both involved injuries sustained by Iraqi prisoners. See Al
Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413,414 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on reh'g en banc, 679
F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Saleh, 580 F.3d at 1-2.
229. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 423 ("The fact that a military interrogator applied
techniques more aggressive than those approved by his commander for aggressive
interrogation would not remove the activity from the military effort, any more than would
a soldier's shooting an enemy soldier even after he had been seized and disarmed.").
230. A few cases before Saleh and Al Shimari refused to extend the combatant
activities exception for this reason. See Getz v. Boeing Co., No. C 07-06396 CW, 2009 WL
636039, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
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was used in a claim and (2) where specifically the setting of the claim
arose on the battlefield. Under each analytical inquiry, the court
would then decide if the PMC actions at issue were both, as the
Johnson court defined, "necessary to and in direct connection with
actual hostilities,""' and, therefore, qualify as supporting combatant
activities. Satisfying either the "service" or the "setting" prong is
adequate to meet the exception; both parts need not apply in every
case. The only other way the contractor-defendant may fit the
combatant activities exception is if the PMC can demonstrate either
(1) that attacks on a military installation occurred at the very location
involved in the claim with some frequency or intensity so as to show a
direct connection with hostilities or (2) that the military installation
itself was so directly connected to hostilities that it would be
unreasonable not to apply the combatant activities exception.
Under the "service" analytical track, courts should inspect how a
PMC service was used during the events at issue. After probing how a
PMC's services were used at the time the claim arose, the court would
then ask whether there was a "necessary" and "direct connection" to
hostilities. Take a soldier who is interrogating a prisoner. The soldier
aims to intimidate the prisoner by ripping off a piece of electrical
wiring that a PMC previously installed-only the soldier proceeds to
electrocute himself because of the PMC's botched wiring. The
"service" prong would preempt the soldier's claim, since this use of
the wiring had the needed "necessary" and "direct connection" to
hostilities because of its purpose in this interrogation. By contrast, if a
soldier turned on a light switch in his room and was electrocuted, that
would not manifest the kind of "necessary" and "direct connection"
to hostilities required to find that a PMC was supporting combatant
activities.232 In the latter case, the tort followed out of a regular use of
the light switch with no other unique circumstances to find a direct
link to hostilities.
Under the "setting" analytical track, courts should identify the
specific setting of a claim on the battlefield. Rather than concluding
that an incident occurring during wartime qualifies per se under the
231. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948) (emphasis added).
232. A regular use of PMC services may show enough of a direct connection to combat
activities on its own absent additional facts. The vivid displays of supporting hostilities
seen in Saleh and Al Shimari are examples of such instances. These two cases would likely
qualify under the "setting" prong of this Comment's approach as well; this prong will be
discussed further in the next Part. PMCs who provide basic support services, however,
would find it difficult to qualify under the "service" prong if claims relate simply to a
regular use of services as in the light switch example above.
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combatant activities exception, courts should note exactly where a
tortious action on the battlefield occurred. If an injury transpired on a
military base, for instance, the court should explore not only the
characteristics of the base as a whole, but also where exactly on that
base the injury occurred. A claim arising out of, for example, the
ammunition room of a military facility would be more likely to be
preempted versus a claim arising out of a soldier's bedroom; the
former houses weapons that are used for combat operations while the
latter is used as a resting place for a soldier.233
Taking this two-part approach together, the combatant activities
exception will not apply if neither the "service" nor the "setting"
prongs show a "necessary. .. and ... direct connection with actual
hostilities."2 34 So at the outset, the combatant activities exception
could protect any PMC activity-be it cleaning toilets or providing
electrical wiring. Yet it is not enough to extend the exception to
PMCs who are simply providing services at a military base-a base
that inevitably has some type of combat-connectedness and dangers
associated with it. At the same time, a PMC's maintenance services
should not be divorced from how and where those services were
being used in a particular suit.
Even if courts using the "service" and "setting" prongs of the
particularized, contextual approach do not find that a PMC is
supporting combatant activities, the contractor-defendant still has the
opportunity to satisfy the exception. Recognizing the many dangers
that PMCs and military personnel alike face in the war zone and on
certain military bases, the contractor-defendant may still qualify for
the exception if it can show either (1) that attacks on a military
installation occurred at the very location involved in the claim with
some frequency or intensity, or (2) that the military installation itself
was so directly connected to hostilities that it would be unreasonable
not to apply the combatant activities exception.
C. Why the Particularized, Contextual Approach Makes Sense
The particularized, contextual approach is a realistic framework
for courts to use in deciding future combatant activity exception
cases. What is more, the approach is grounded in case law and strikes
a reasonable balance against the competing interests of PMC
233. A counterargument to this assertion is that the bedroom may house a soldier
involved in combat operations. But this Comment's approach emphasizes a narrower
analytical scheme, and so it is more prudent to focus on the primary purpose of such a
setting.
234. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 770.
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liabilities during wartime. First, the approach flows from the holdings
and limitations of Saleh and Al Shimari. The Saleh decision explains
that the exception does not apply to every PMC activity."' As
previously discussed, however, Saleh and Al Shimari's flexible
understandings of military command authority make it rare to
exclude a PMC independently from the exception on command
authority grounds.23 6 This approach, then, hinges on whether a PMC
action relates to a "combatant activity" under the exception. But this
Comment disfavors a reading of "combatant activity" that would
foreclose the combatant activities exception per se to certain kinds of
services, as seen in cases like Bixby, McManaway, and Lessin.237
Rather, to conclude if a PMC action would be "discrete" enough to
fall outside the combatant activities exception,2 38 this approach
prefers a fact-specific approach found in cases like Aiello, Harris, In
re KBR, Inc., and Taylor (albeit with a narrower focus) to discern
whether a PMC service derived out of a "combatant activity."23 9
Second, this approach also balances the contending interests
previously discussed in this Comment.240 On one hand, the approach
affirms the realities of PMC integration with the military and the
importance of limiting tort claims during wartime. 241 These interests
are harbored in this approach's permissive understanding of what
constitutes military command authority over PMCs,2 42 which respects
that the military and PMCs work together toward one goal on the
battlefield. In fact, this approach allows for any PMC activity to
qualify for the combatant activities exception, which underscores
the widespread availability of this exception during wartime.
On the other hand, certain safeguards in this approach exist so
that the combatant activities exception does not preempt every
possible tort claim. These safeguards not only reflect doubts from
those skeptical about extending this exception to PMCs in the first
place, particularly with injuries involving American military and non-
military personnel;2" they also reflect the very words found in Saleh's
235. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
236. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
238. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
239. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part III.A.2.
241. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
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limiting language. 245 Determining whether a PMC service or setting at
issue arose from supporting combatant activities is a threshold
question. The answer to this question appropriately distinguishes
between permissible tort claims on the battlefield and those that
would surely burden wartime efforts. A particularized, contextual
approach permits the court to take a discriminating look at the
specific facts surrounding tort claims on the battlefield, and it sensibly
avoids any blanket rule on preempting all PMC activities during
wartime.
A trade-off to this approach is the "possibility that military
commanders could be hauled into civilian courts"246 to answer
questions arising from tort suits, which undoubtedly implicates
unique federal interests. 247 But procedural rules and "other legal
doctrines"248 can blunt probable intrusions into battlefield
capabilities.249 Presumably, this Comment's approach could also shed
the most sensitive claims involving actual combat operations and
activities, which would burden military commanders more than other,
non-combat activity claims. Given the worry over the breadth of the
combatant activities exception to PMCs, though, this Comment's
approach accepts the compromise.
This Comment's fact-specific approach defining a "combatant
activity" also means there is no per se exception to PMC activities
that arise out of a military installation located in a war zone. At first
blush, this may seem counterintuitive. After all, a military base is by
its very nature engaged in some kind of combatant activities during
wartime. But, according to Johnson's definition of combatant
activities, although a PMC's services that are taking place at a military
base show its services are likely "necessary to"2" the war effort, this
245. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
246. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
247. See id. at 418; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-79 (1950) (noting
concerns with giving enemy aliens access to U.S. courts, which would "hamper our war
effort" and "diminish the prestige of our commanders").
248. Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 436 (King, J., dissenting) ("Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45, for example, compels the district courts to quash subpoenas calling for
privileged matter or that would cause an undue burden. Moreover, the government
remains free to invoke the state secrets doctrine."); see also Saleh, 580 F.3d at 29 (Garland,
J., dissenting) ("Where discovery would hamper the military's mission, district courts can
and must delay it-until personnel return stateside, or until the end of the war if
necessary. Where production of witnesses or documents would damage national security
regardless of timing, the usual privileges apply. To deny preemption is not to grant
plaintiffs free reign.").
249. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 436 (King, J., dissenting).
250. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
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fact alone does not illustrate a "direct connection with actual
hostilities"a that would evince a PMC supporting combatant
activities.
There are several reasons for this assertion. As discussed earlier,
this new approach takes seriously the limiting language found in Saleh
and the competing interests on the scope of the combatant activities
exception.252 As a result, analyzing the "service" and "setting" prongs
of this particularized, contextual approach should be a narrow
inquiry.2 53 Simply put, it would not be enough to state that a claim
emanated from the Afghanistan War, or from a military installation
housing over 30,000 military personnel and PMCs in Iraq.254 Rather,
courts should more closely scrutinize if a claim arose out of, say, a
tank maintenance facility at a military base,255 or inside of a toilet
facility at a base camp." 6 This closer inspection translates into a more
demanding, fact-specific analysis in finding whether a PMC's actions
will have the requisite "direct connection with actual hostilities."5
Nor is a soldier or PMC's daily life at a large military base always
associated with an onslaught of attacks or launching of tactical
operations. There are large groups of military personnel who rarely, if
ever, engage in combat activities off of a military base; they instead
provide logistical support from a military base to those infantry
personnel who may be working from more dangerous combat
operations outposts.2 8 Pejoratively called "fobbits"25 9 or "pogues,"260
251. See id. (emphasis added).
252. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
253. See supra Part III.B.
254. See Balad Air Base, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/worldliraq/balad-ab.htm (last modified Nov. 1, 2011) (describing the size and
resources of the Balad Air Base).
255. See Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 404 (4th Cir.
2011).
256. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
257. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
258. See Richard Tomkins, FOBs the Closest Thing to Home in Iraq, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2008, at A15, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/
mar/26/briefing-fobs-the-closest-thing-to-home-in-iraq ("Combat operations posts . . . are
located in towns and villages miles from forward operating bases. This is where the 'door
kickers' can live for days before rotating back to a forward operating base, conducting
anti-terrorist sweeps, presence patrols and other nitty-gritty duties in a counterinsurgency
war-all the while risking snipers and improvised explosive devices.").
259. In Taji, IRAQPARTIl (SEPr. 24, 2007, 2:32 PM), http://iraqpartii.blogspot.com/
2007 09 01 archive.html (describing oneself as a "fobbit" because of a logistical officer
role on base). The term seemingly combines the forward operating base abbreviation,
FOB, with the Hobbit characters that do not leave the safety of the Shire in J.R.R.
Tolkien's Lord of the Rings series. See generally J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE
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these military members may "battl[e] boredom"26' at their military
base as they wait for a summoning of their non-combat services.2 62
The prevalence of PMCs at forward operating bases ("FOBs") in
the recent Iraq War buttresses this Comment's narrow approach as
well. FOBs are "large-to-huge logistics and support areas where
munitions and supplies are stored, vehicles are maintained or
repaired, headquarter detachments are based, mail is received,
medical care is available and facilities such as showers and recreation
centers help relieve the stress of deployment and missions 'outside
the wire.' "26 FOBs in Iraq offered access to internet cafes, phones,
post exchanges, and even quiet courtyard areas for rest and
relaxation. 2" These FOBs also presented a variety of dining options
at their facilities,' including an array of global food chains.266 Such
observations affirm the scrupulous manner in which the "service" and
"setting" prongs of the particularized, contextual approach apply for
military installations generally. Without this limited reach, the
individual in our introductory hypothetical,267 with injuries stemming
from a corporation's poor latrine, electrical, and waste maintenance,
would be left without any recourse on a self-enclosed military base of
30,000 people-the size of a small town-though the very same
RINGS (Collector's Ed. 1987) (describing the adventures of the fictional characters who
eventually do leave the safety of the Shire).
260. The term Pogue, or sometimes POG, stands for "persons other than grunts." The
grunts are the ones who are physically engaging in combat activities, such as infantryman.
See The Problem of Perception, THE CALM BEFORE THE SAND (Apr. 14, 2007, 4:12 PM),
http://calmbeforethesand.blogspot.com/2007/04/problem-of-perception.html ("People only
see either the Grunts or the Pogues. The Grunts are the Infantrymen, raiding homes,
staring at death daily, and going months at a time without so much as a phone call or a
letter from home. The Pogues are the rest; the support or otherwise noncombat soldiers
who may or may not even go out the wire.").
261. Id.
262. This is not to suggest that military personnel engaged in these support roles should
not qualify for the combatant activities exception-they can. Recall that the unique
training and supervision of military personnel justifies their broader immunities. See 3
NANDA & PANSIuS, supra note 222, § 14A:6, at n.74.
263. Tomkins, supra note 258.
264. See, e.g., Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK) Training Camp, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/mek.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2011)
(describing the amenities offered for personnel stationed at the MEK Compound).
265. See Tomkins, supra note 258 (describing the size of dining facilities at FOBs); At
the DFAC, IRAQPARTII (Oct. 14,2007,1:18 PM), http://iraqpartii.blogspot.com/2007/10/at-
dfac.html (detailing the food offerings at KBR-run dining facility in Taji, Iraq).
266. See How the Spartans Were Conquered, CASTRA PRAETORIA (Apr. 17, 2009, 9:03
PM), http://www.castrapraetorial.blogspot.com/2009/04/how-spartans-were-conquered
.html (noting the prevalence of Subway, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, Burger King, KFC,
Cinnabon, and Green Bean Coffee at a military base).
267. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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injuries could give rise to tortious claims against a corporation in an
actual small town in the United States.
None of these remarks should understate the real dangers that
soldiers and contractors can face 26 8 even in the confines of a FOB, as
noted in both Aiello and Taylor,69 and the crucial work that both
military personnel and contractors provide from a FOB or other type
of large military installation. To that end, this Comment's approach
gives PMCs an additional avenue to fit within the combatant activities
exception by placing the burden on the contractor-defendants to
illustrate either that (1) attacks on a military installation occurred at
the very location involved in the claim with some frequency or
intensity so as to show a direct connection with hostilities, or (2) the
military installation itself was so directly connected to hostilities that
it would be unreasonable not to apply the combatant activities
exception.
Given this Comment's narrower approach, the contractor-
defendant must do more than purely say that mortar and rocket
attacks have sprung on a base. Rather, the contractor-defendant
should point to where such attacks have erupted on the base at the
time of the claim. If mortar and rocket attacks have regularly ensued
on the outskirts of a base, for instance, with no major injuries to base
personnel, these attacks would fail to show the "necessary" and
"direct connection" to hostilities under this approach. By contrast, a
base with an unusually high level of damaging mortar and rocket
attacks in places near the location of the actual claim might have a
better chance of falling under this exception.2 70
268. See, e.g., Bernd Debussmann, In Outsourced U.S. Wars, Contractor Deaths Top
1,000, REUTERS NEWS (Jul. 3, 2007), http://www.reuters.cornlarticle/2007/07/03/us-usa-
iraq-contractors-idUSN318650320070703?sp=true (noting how over 1,000 contractors
had been killed and over 13,000 wounded in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).
269. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 713
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting three mortar and rocket attacks on base); Taylor v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-341, 2010 WL 1707530, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16,
2010, amended Apr. 19, 2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011)
(noting monthly mortar fire on military base); Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (noting consistent mortar attacks on base),
appeal dismissed, 618 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2010)). As explained below, however, these attacks
would not help KBR meet its burden under this Comment's approach. See infra Part IV.C.
270. Camp Anaconda may have been a model location where a PMC could have met
its burden of proof in this regard. See Anita Powell, Attacks on the Decrease at LSA
Anaconda, aka 'Mortaritaville,' STARS & STRIPES (Jul. 22, 2006), http://www.stripes.com/
news/attacks-on-the-decrease-at-lsa-anaconda-aka-mortaritaville-1.51876 (noting that
Camp Anaconda was the subject of so many mortar attacks that it was known as
"Mortaritaville" by personnel stationed there).
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Likewise, one can imagine a situation in which the nature of the
military installation itself-such as with a combat operations outpost
housed in a village miles away from a FOB that conducts protective
sweeps and counterintelligence work2"-would almost always be
evidence of a "direct connection with actual hostilities."27 2 In such a
scenario, it would be difficult for courts to undertake a "service" and
"setting" analysis that separates the regular, day-to-day functions of a
combat operations outpost since the location and uses of that outpost
are so heavily concentrated on, or in support of, actual combatant
activities.273
IV. UTILIZING THIS NEW APPROACH: REASSESSING
THE KBR CASES
This Part reviews the KBR cases under the particularized,
contextual approach discussed in Part III and considers whether any
of the decisions would change as a result. This analysis and
commentary can prove useful for future PMC cases involving not only
KBR but also other PMCs providing basic support services to the
American military during wartime.
Under this Comment's approach, Taylor, Carmichael, and Lessin
would fall under the combatant activities exception, while the
remaining KBR cases would not. Using this approach, the Aiello case
and the two cases that relied on its reasoning-Harris and In re KBR,
Inc.-were wrongly decided.2 74 At the outset, it should also be noted
that because the claims against KBR arise under its LOGCAP
contract with the military, and under the direction and coordination
of a Mayor's Cell at all of the military bases, KBR services were
under broad military command authority as understood under Saleh
and Al Shimari.275 Therefore, this Part targets whether KBR's services
constitute supporting "combatant activities."
A. Cases Where the Combatant Activities Exception Would Apply:
Taylor, Carmichael, and Lessin
First, this Comment's approach would agree with the Fourth
Circuit's Taylor decision to invoke the combatant activities
271. See Tomkins, supra note 258.
272. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
273. See Tomkins, supra note 258.
274. The Lessin case would also be wrongly decided under this Comment's approach.
But the case was decided before Saleh, and so it is imprudent to link that case with Aiello,
Harris, and In re KBR, Inc. in the subsequent discussion.
275. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
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exception.2 76 Following the particularized, contextual approach, the
court could first inquire about how the service was being used at the
time of the claim. In Taylor, the claim arose from the KBR contractor
providing his regular electrical service to the base. The soldier was
repowering a portion of the base camp after an electrical wiring
malfunction caused a power outage. 277 This action, on its own, would
not adhere to the conditions of the combatant activities exception.
But Taylor's facts also show that the Marines involved took steps to
rectify the power outage on their own,'78 so it is not entirely clear if a
"direct connection with actual hostilities" 27 9 existed based on this fact
alone.
Despite the fuzziness of the "service" prong analysis, matters
simplify if a court were to analyze the setting in which the claim
began. Here, a soldier was electrocuted at a section of the base that
maintained tanks and other assault vehicles,20 vehicles that are
undoubtedly involved in combat operations. This fact proves crucial
in concluding that the service provided in this instance was in "direct
connection with actual hostilities."2 1
Although Carmichael was decided on political question
grounds,282 this Comment's approach makes plain that the combatant
activities exception should also apply to these kinds of convoy cases,
thereby overturning the previous understanding in Lessin.283 In
Carmichael, which follows from similar facts in Lessin,28 the
contractor was providing a convoy service, driving supplies from one
base to another."' Under the "service" prong of this Comment's
approach, the KBR contractor's convoy service did not have the
direct relationship to hostilities needed to trigger the combatant
276. Recall that the combatant activities exception was an alternative holding for the
Fourth Circuit panel, where two of the three judges held that the political question
doctrine applied, and two of the three judges (including one overlapping judge) believed
that the combatant activities exception should apply. See Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root
Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 413 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
277. See id. at 403-04 (majority opinion).
278. See id. at 404.
279. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
280. See Taylor, 658 F.3d at 404.
281. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 770. In contrast, this "service" prong analysis is what proves
unsuccessful for KBR in the Harris case discussed below. See infra note 292 and
accompanying text.
282. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.
2009).
283. Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at
*3-4 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
284. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
285. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1275.
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activities exception. Though the vehicle ultimately was turned over, at
its core, the events stemmed from the use of a convoy service.2 86
As with Taylor, though, the "setting" prong proves dispositive. In
Carmichael, the convoy service was not cropping up at the base, or
some road outside the warzone; it was quite literally on the
battlefield, traveling from one base to another outside the confines of
the protections afforded at their respective base camps.287 The
dangers of this route were apparent because the convoy was assigned
military escorts and traveled with gun trucks and Humvees along the
way. 288 These facts illuminate the "direct connection to actual
hostilities" needed to meet the combatant activities exception.
B. Cases Where the Combatant Activities Exception Would Not
Apply: Bixby and McManaway
In Bixby and McManaway, it is impossible for any PMC activity
at the Qarmat Ali water plant 89 to conform to the combatant
activities exception since this Comment's approach is unsuitable to a
water plant that, in the district courts' minds, focused on restoring
Iraq's oil production without any involvement in present battlefield
activities. 90 Even ignoring the courts' mutual understanding of the
water plant-and instead viewing the plant as part of the larger
military effort in Iraq-does not help KBR. The "service" prong
offers KBR little assistance since all of the work in Bixby and
McManaway involved health and safety inspections with no direct
bond to combat activities.2 91
The "setting" prong would also prove fruitless since the claims
accrued over a three-month period where KBR failed to disclose to
its superiors the harmful carcinogen found at the water plant.2 " The
lack of a direct connection to hostilities in this case is fairly clear
under the proposed approach. Though the plant was a "dangerous
place to work,"" KBR could not overcome the presumption that the
water plant was not subject to an inordinate amount of dangers or
286. This thinking mimics the Lessin court's reasoning. Lesssin, 2006 WL 3940556, at
*4.
287. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1277-78.
288. See id. at 1276; see also Yasin, supra note 10, at 462-63 (noting the dangers that
KBR convoys have faced in various warzones).
289. See McManaway v. KBR, Inc., CIV.A. H-10-1044, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 4, 2012); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2010).
290. See McManaway, 2012 WL 6033259, at *9; Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
291. See Bixby, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32.
292. See id. at 1232.
293. Id. at 1246.
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that the plant itself was not so heavily ingrained in combat
operations. 294 In its last opportunity to fit within the combatant
activities exception, then, KBR would not meet its burden in these
cases.
C. Rejecting the Aiello Line of Cases's Broad Reading of the
Combatant Activities Exception
This Comment's approach conflicts with the rulings in Aiello,
Harris, and In re KBR, Inc. In Aiello, the court found that the
combatant activities exception preempted a tort suit for injuries
suffered by a civilian contractor after falling inside of a KBR-
managed toilet facility.295 Relying on Aiello, the Harris court found
that a tort suit for a soldier's electrocution in a KBR-managed shower
was also preempted.2 96 In re KBR, Inc. leaned on Aiello when it
explained that the combatant activities exception preempted claims
against KBR for its improper and unhealthy waste disposal methods
through its burn pits. 297 Applying this Comment's analytical approach,
however, yields different results.
In Aiello, the "service" prong of the particularized, contextual
analysis would prove unsuccessful for KBR. The claim arose out of
the regular use of a toilet. With no other unique circumstances noted,
the court would have been unable to find a needed "direct
connection" to combat operations. The "setting" prong offers no
additional help for KBR either. The injury occurred inside of a toilet
facility with no other tie-in to hostilities other than the toilet being
located on a forward operating base.298
In Harris, KBR would also face an impasse under a
particularized, contextual approach. The "service" prong does not
assist KBR. The soldier in Harris was electrocuted during a regular
use of the shower because of KBR's slipshod electrical wiring.299 Also,
asking where the setting of the claim was located would not aid KBR
since a shower lacks the "direct connection to actual hostilities"
needed to find a combatant activity. Unlike in Taylor where the
294. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
295. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
296. See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 (W.D.
Pa. 2012).
297. See In re KBR Hl, RWT 09MD2083, 2013 WL 709826, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 27,
2013).
298. See Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 700-01.
299. See Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
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"setting" prong proved beneficial,00 that is not the case here where
the claim was merely related to someone using the shower.
KBR would also have little luck with the particularized,
contextual approach under the facts of In re KBR, Inc. The
"mundane" tasks of "waste disposal and water supply"3 01 certainly do
not comply with the "service" prong. The "setting" prong analysis is
different from Aiello and Harris since "claims do not relate to a
specific, discrete event, but rather to conditions endured in vast
theaters of war in two countries over extended periods of time."3 02
But even so, KBR could not show the direct connection needed to
hostilities. The burn pits were located on military installations
throughout Afghanistan and Iraq,303 not on some remote, exposed
location in the middle of the battlefield.
KBR's final opportunity to use the combatant activities
exception in any of these cases, then, would rest on whether the
frequency and intensity of attacks on a particular section of the base,
or that the base itself was so directly engaged in combat operations,
make it so that the exception should apply. But KBR would still fail
to meet the exception. The base in Aiello was a FOB, which will not
help KBR meet its burden under this Comment's approach. 304 Nor
would the mortar attacks mentioned in Aielloso be enough to satisfy
this burden and establish an immediate connection to hostilities.
Along with no additional facts about these mortar and rocket attacks'
proximity to the toilet facilities in Aiello,3 06 this approach would not
find an ample "direct connection to actual hostilities."3 07
KBR would have an even weaker case in Harris. The events
surfaced at the Radwaniyah Palace Complex, the former main
residence of Saddam Hussein.3 o The entire complex consisted of 144
buildings3 09 and had "limited reports" of mortar and shelling outside
300. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
301. KBR II, 2013 WL 709826, at *2.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
305. See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 713
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
306. The court mentions that one of these attacks damaged several trucks and housing
units, but it is unclear where these attacks occurred in relation to the toilet facilities. See
id.
307. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767,770 (9th Cir. 1948).
308. See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (W.D.
Pa. 2012); Radwaniyah Presidential Site, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/radwaniyah-cc.htm (last modified Sept. 7, 2011).
309. See Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
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the base ever "affecting base life."310 The strongest argument KBR
could raise is that Special Forces troops were housed at the
complex."' But given the complex's size and its removal from more
dangerous military outposts, 312 this Comment's approach would not
save KBR.
The facts from In re KBR, Inc., too, would not offer the company
any comfort. The burn pits were located on large military bases that
housed tens of thousands of military personnel. 13 Absent any more
facts about how some of these specific claims commenced, it should
be assumed that the injuries were related to regular waste and water
services with no significant instances of attacks near the burn pits.
At any rate, the Aiello court outlined why it believed latrine
services were "necessary facilities" 3 14 related to supporting combatant
activities. 315 The court even drew from historical examples involving
the failed upkeep of latrines in supporting combat operations during
the Punic, Revolutionary, and Spanish-American wars.3 1 ' But if one is
to accept this reasoning in Aiello, then it is hard to demarcate which
activities would be "discrete" enough to fall outside the combatant
activities exception. 17 For one thing, a food service worker could also
fall under the exception since food also is a "necessary" part of
sustaining combat operations. Under this Comment's approach,
however, these activities lack the "direct connection" also required by
the definition of "combatant activity." 3 1  Aiello's approach, which
Harris and In re KBR, Inc. adopt, did not fully appreciate Saleh's
limiting language, t 9 and as a result, it incorrectly favored KBR. Of
course, the effect of this particularized, contextual approach is that,
although "necessary to" wartime efforts, the latrine, water, and trash
310. Id. at 596.
311. See id. at 548.
312. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (discussing how a military outpost
could be more likely to receive combatant activity protection).
313. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 135, at 137 (discussing burn pits located at Balad Air
Base that "consumed about 250 tons of waste a day, exposing 25,000 U.S. military
personnel and thousands of contractors to toxic fumes."); Balad Air Base, supra note 254
(describing Balad Air Base).
314. Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 714 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
315. See id. at 713-14.
316. See id.
317. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("We recognize that a
service contractor might be supplying services in such a discrete manner-perhaps even in
a battlefield context-that those services could be judged separate and apart from combat
activities of the U.S. military.").
318. See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
319. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
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services outlined in Aiello, Harris, and In re KBR, Inc. will rarely
have the "direct connection with actual hostilities" under the
combatant activities exception.3 20 But as seen in Taylor, Carmichael,
and Lessin, regular maintenance services can be protected under the
right circumstances. Although it is hard to imagine when latrine,
electrical, or waste services could fit the exception.3 21
CONCLUSION
Enlarging the FTCA's combatant activities exception3 2  to cover
the contractors in Saleh and Al Shimari is a proper response to the
growing importance and assimilation of PMCs in contemporary
American warfare.323 But this new reality should not translate into
assigning the combatant activities exception in every battlefield
context where PMCs are present-a view reflected in the Saleh
court's limiting language.3 24 Divisions have gushed in the aftermath of
Saleh and Al Shimari over when to use the exception in lawsuits
against basic support services contractors like KBR.3 25 With that in
mind, this Comment proposes a method for courts to use when
resolving whether tort claims against a PMC should fall under the
combatant activities exception. The approach encompasses both prior
case law and foremost policy interests.
In brief, this Comment argues that courts should use a
particularized, contextual approach to what constitutes a "combatant
activity." This approach calls for courts to conduct two inquiries,
either of which would allow a PMC to meet the combatant activities
exception. Courts should (1) analyze how the PMC service itself was
used during the time of the claim, and (2) analyze where the specific
setting of a particular claim arose on the battlefield, and determine if
either prong details actions that were "both necessary to and in direct
connection with actual hostilities."3 26 Along with the "service" and
320. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 770.
321. Perhaps the following three unlikely scenarios that could occur while a base was
under attack would fall within the exception: (1) if a soldier used the top cover of a toilet
as a shield against the enemy, but he was injured by the use of the "toilet shield;" (2) if a
soldier turned on a fire hose against the enemy, but he was injured by the subsequent
water stream; or (3) if a soldier was attacked on a base and proceeded to throw the enemy
into a fiery burn pit, but he was injured after falling into the burn pit as well. KBR's
services in these contexts would qualify as a "combatant activity" under both the "service"
and "setting" prongs of this Comment's analytical framework.
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
323. See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
324. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
325. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
326. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948).
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"setting" prongs, this Comment's approach affords a contractor-
defendant another chance to reach the combatant activities exception
if it can meet its burden to show that (1) attacks on a base occurred at
the very location involved in the claim with some frequency or
intensity so as to show a direct connection with hostilities, or (2) the
base itself was so directly connected to hostilities that it would be
unreasonable not to apply the combatant activities exception.
Thus, the combatant activities exception would not heedlessly
preempt claims against PMCs arising out of a regular use of its
services and at an area of a base or battlefield that has no immediate
connection to hostilities. As shown in cases like Taylor and
Carmichael, basic support PMCs can successfully use the exception in
the appropriate battlefield context with a real, direct association to
hostilities that satisfies the combatant activities exception. Without a
direct link to hostilities, however, PMCs will struggle to meet the
exception.
In the end, the injured individual A from our earlier hypothetical
on the military base32' would be in luck. His claims would not be
preempted. And absent more facts that reveal the toilet, shower, or
trash facilities were home to several enemy attacks, it is highly
unlikely that corporation B could meet its burden to restore the use
of the combatant activities exception. Corporation B might need to
call that defense lawyer after all.
S. YASIR LATIFIf
327. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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